This paper aims to assess the nature and significance of Lord Wedderburn's contribution to the elaboration of a theory of labour law. Noting the extent to which Wedderburn was influenced, in this respect as in others, by the work of Otto Kahn-Freund, it focuses on the question of whether Wedderburn ever developed a theory of labour law that was clearly distinguishable from KahnFreund's. Were there significant differences in the two scholars' expositions of abstentionism, or collective laissez-faire? Through a close reading of Wedderburn's work, it is suggested that Wedderburn was a strong proponent of the principle of collective laissez-fare, in his early as well as his later writing. In the changed political context of the 1980s and 1990s, he undertook the important task of seeking to update or restate the principle as an expression of social-democratic values in the field of work and working relationships.
I. Introduction
In his approach to scholarship, and in terms of the substance of his position on the theory of labour law, there can be little doubt that Lord Wedderburn was strongly influenced by the work of Otto Kahn-Freund (1900 -1975 .
1 This is hardly surprising given the time at which Wedderburn began researching and teaching the subject. The two were contemporaries, behind him in the Weimar Republic. 2 When Wedderburn first devised a course on 'industrial law' in Cambridge in 1961, the writings of Kahn-Freund, including the famous 1950s collective laissez-faire trilogy, were prominent amongst the materials available to draw on. 3 Most importantly perhaps, Kahn-Freund's writing -both the substance of his analysis and his methodology or approach -fitted well with Wedderburn's existing political convictions and trade union sympathies. Emulation of the older scholar's method allowed him to make the kinds of argument that he wished to make.
The central aim of this article is to address the question whether it is possible to identify a theory of labour law in Wedderburn's work that is clearly distinguishable from Kahn-Freund's. In order to identify and assess Wedderburn's position, the article focuses on his exposition of the notion of abstentionism, or collective laissez-faire, exploring the question of differences in the thinking of the two scholars. 4 In a third section, extended consideration is given to the recommendations of the Bullock Committee as a matter over which they famously disagreed.
5
In the course of the article, it is suggested that in his earlier writing, Wedderburn followed the teachings of Kahn-Freund closely, adopting the principle of collective laissez-faire with enthusiasm as a framework through which to present an analysis of labour law as a single, coherent legal discipline. In places, he appeared to express a degree of scepticism, even, regarding the value of law as a means of furthering the interests of workers. Citing Kahn-Freund with approval, he suggested that the British system was best understood as 'abstentionist', straightforwardly understood in terms of a withdrawal of the state from the arena of industrial relations. In later writing -in particular on the question of the desirable response of scholars to . 4 As is explained in the course of the paper, Wedderburn tended, in his early work, to use the terms 'abstentionism' and 'collective laissez-faire' interchangeably, emphasising, like Kahn-Freund, the degree to which the British state had chosen to 'abstain' from involvement in the field of industrial relations. In later work, he sought to restate or redefine collective laissez-faire so as to divorce it from the notion of state abstentionism. While it might be difficult to argue, then, that Wedderburn ever developed a theory of labour law that was wholly distinguishable from collective laissez-faire, he did undertake the very important task of explaining, expanding upon, and updating the principle as an expression of social-democratic values in the field of work and working relationships.
II. The Worker and the Law
Most workers want nothing more of the law than that it should leave them alone.
6
In the very significant body of work published by Wedderburn in the field of labour law over the course of a long career, the three editions of the textbook The Worker and the Law occupy a central position. The first edition of the text appeared in 1965, and the second and third in 1971 and 1986, each substantially revised and progressively longer. Extending by the last of these to over 800 pages, the texts today offer numerous valuable insights, not only into the state of the law and industrial relations at the time, but also into the thinking of the author as it developed during more than two decades.
As Bob Hepple has argued, expressing his 'appreciation' of the work in 2013, the first edition of
The Worker and the Law made a major contribution to labour law scholarship in the UK by providing for the first time a comprehensive account of the whole field: demarcating boundaries with other legal disciplines, and analysing 'all' of the relevant law. 7 Other textbooks then available failed to present labour law as a single, coherent subject, offering instead only a rather limited, black-letter analysis of a sometimes seemingly disparate collection of legal rules -the common law of master and servant, for example, and the factories and mines legislation. 8 Any discussion of collective bargaining in legal textbooks tended to be most notable by its absence, or brevity. 9 By 1965, Kahn-Freund had, of course, published a number of works which lent coherence to the field by way of the elucidation of the principle of collective laissez-faire. 10 It is presumably to these works that Wedderburn referred in the Preface to the first edition, when he stated that there had, 'been created in this decade a new recognition of the coherence of Labour
Law as a subject of study'. 11 Kahn-Freund had not attempted to write a comprehensive textbook, however, nor anywhere otherwise to analyse the field in its entirety. Here was the gap, then, that Wedderburn intended to plug.
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The second great strength of The Worker and the Law identified by Hepple was the clarity with which it explained its subject matter. By its own assertion, the text was intended for 'the general reader and student of our social and legal system', rather than for the academic community, or legal practitioners. 13 Its aim was to provide 'a simple account of the relationship between British workers and the law'; 'a general guide to the impact of law on the field of employment', 14 Wedderburn, too, emphasised, time and again, the importance of trade union autonomy, and the inappropriateness of law courts as a forum for the resolution of industrial conflicts. His firmly held belief was that the judiciary tended, almost as a matter of course, to be guided in their decision-making by a wish to further the interests of their own -employing, capital-owningclass. 44 It was for that reason that trade unions wished industrial disputes to be kept out of the courts; 45 and, it was for that reason that a wider social consensus had emerged that this should be so. 46 'Judges, employers, unions, and the legislature have combined to agree on one point, namely that, whatever else was done about industrial conflict and labour relations, the lawyers must be kept out'. 47 As presented by Wedderburn in The Worker and the Law, the abstentionist tradition in British industrial relations meant, above all, the keeping of disputes out of the courts.
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In later work, as we shall see, Wedderburn was mildly critical of Kahn-Freund's tendency to over-emphasise, at times, the extent to which the state had truly 'abstained', and did truly abstain, from the sphere of industrial relations. The suggestion inherent in the idea of abstention of no or only limited law (and extralegal state intervention) was misleading: what was singular about the British system was the character rather than the quantity of labour law. 49 In making In the third edition of The Worker and the Law -in recognition, in part, of the significant changes to the legal framework and to society that had occurred by that time -the discussion was a little more nuanced. When it came to the identification of the principle of collective laissez-faire as a rationalization for the legal unenforceability of collective agreements together with further characteristics of the law, the ascription of originality to Kahn-Freund was likely rather more warranted. 69 In turning and fairness. 83 As a basis for his critique, Collins defined abstentionism, or collective laissezfaire, as having at its core both a concern for the promotion of industrial democracy -to be achieved by means of the guarantee of a right to strike, and the institution of collective bargaining -and an 'insistence of the impotence of law' to achieve those aims. 84 So defined, abstentionism and its proponents could be criticised for overestimating the capacity of collective bargaining to realize the 'ideals of democracy', and for grossly underestimating the significance and potential usefulness of legislation in shaping and directly regulating such relations.
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In 1995, Wedderburn took the opportunity to mount a sustained defence of collective laissezfaire. 86 The main thrust of the defence involved the claim that those who criticised the principle did so on the basis of a flawed understanding of it. In order to make this claim, Wedderburn drew the most nuanced picture yet of its meaning, suggesting again that the values at the core of collective laissez-faire remained relevant notwithstanding the changed political and economic conditions of the time. Indeed, this was the primary argument of the piece as set out in its decision-making powers to committees to which no employees were admitted. 118 Kahn-Freund's general 'scepticism' towards employee representation in organs of corporate governance dated, he explained, from that time: 'how difficult it is, at an advanced age to abandon firm views formed in the past'! 119 It was also informed -as is quite clear from the nature of his argumentsby his firmly pluralist understanding of industrial relations: 120 his long-held belief in the inevitability and universality of conflicts of interest between the two sides of industry, and his deeply held scepticism regarding the possibility of eradicating them. 121 The first objection raised by him to the Bullock proposals was, quite straightforwardly, that the new mechanisms were unlikely to be effective. Given the different interests of the employee and shareholder representatives, the board would operate as an 'institutionalised coalition', quite unsuited to the day-to-day management of the company. 122 Consequent to the appointment of worker-directors, it would likely become restricted in its functions, with the role of senior management expanded accordingly. 123 A second, closely related, concern arose by reason of the legal duty that was to be placed upon boards, according to the proposals, to represent 'the company's' interests. 124 This was problematic, Kahn-Freund thought, because, while the socalled 'interest of the company' was always coincident with an interest of the shareholders, situations could arise where it would be wholly opposed to the interests of the workers. 125 Simply positing a unitary set of 'company' interests could not solve the underlying problem of the existence of conflicts of interests arising between employees and shareholders. By reason of the imposition of the legal duty, then, the employee representatives would be exposed 'to a conflict of duties which is simply insoluble', representing simultaneously the interests of the workforce, and the so-called 'interest of the company'.
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A third objection related to the absence in the British system of a lower tier of worker representation -a 'substructure' -functionally equivalent to the works councils of the (postwar, more effective) West German system. 127 While the Bullock committee had recognised the importance of a robust substructure -'changes at the board level are not themselves sufficient to ensure an extension of industrial democracy ... a sufficiently well developed structure of participation below the board is clearly vital' -it had concluded that existing, voluntary, arrangements in the UK were robust enough. 128 The committee had in any case been restricted in terms of its remit to consider the problem of board-level representation, and the TUC had rejected any possibility of a 'statutory substructure' on the grounds that it might pose a threat to union organisation at plant level. In Kahn-Freund's opinion, the failure to formalise or institutionalise a system of worker representation at plant level was problematic. In existing systems of codetermination, including the German, the plant was the real focal point: the site most proximate to workers, where the issues of most importance to workers were decided.
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Key to the effectiveness of the German system, in Kahn-Freund's opinion, was the wide range of statutory rights that works councils enjoyed to codetermination in matters of job security, dismissals, the transfer of ownership of plants. 130 To be effective, he wrote, an edifice of statutory participation had to be built from the bottom upwards. and Wedderburn's opinion, it was quite simply wrong to suggest that the Bullock Committee had proposed that such conflicts be ignored or suppressed; that it had assumed a 'unity of interest between employer and employee'. 132 To the contrary, the proposals were directed precisely at facilitating the introduction of a mechanism of corporate governance that would allow for the expression and resolution of conflicts. 133 The reference in the proposals to the 'interests' of the company was not intended to imply, as Kahn-Freund had understood, the existence of a 'selfperpetuating entity ... whose "interests" transcend those of any of its component elements'.
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As would fall to be clarified quite explicitly within the new legislation, the phrase 'the company's best interests' was meant rather as a shorthand way of referring to two sets of (quite possible competing) interests, those of the employees, and those of the shareholders. to-day problems and thereby gain experience and skill that can be progressively applied to more difficult questions.
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But it was equally the case that a well-developed substructure, involving participation for workers in deciding a wide range of questions, and strong links with board-level representation, 
V Conclusion
No scholarship is possible without conviction, without a view of the totality. 160 Lord Wedderburn's scholarship in the field of labour law was deeply and unashamedly political. 161 It was informed, above all, by his socialism: his concern with democracy, social justice, and inequalities between the social classes. And it was directed, quite explicitly, at the advocacy of particular interpretations, or amendments, of the law: he made no secret, in his writing, of where his political sympathies lay. He was a fantastic writer and communicator;
invariably a joy to read.
In his early writings on labour law, Wedderburn adopted the framework of collective laissezfaire enthusiastically because it fitted with his existing political convictions. It fitted too with his preferred approach to scholarship, which was broadly socio-legal and historical; what came to be referred to as a 'law in context' approach. As Hepple has noted, Wedderburn came to labour law originally through a study of labour history. 162 In the first edition of The Worker and the Law, All that said, it would be a mistake, I think, to overstate the differences of opinion that separated the two scholars on the question of the rightful role of the state in industrial relations. 165 collectivist system of industrial relations. 167 As we have seen, Wedderburn himself did not often admit of significant points of disagreement with the older scholar. Where he did criticize KahnFreund, in rather strong terms, was in respect of the latter's proposed solution to the challenges faced in British industrial relations in the 1970s: coordination of the different levels of industrial organisation through the increased use of centralized collective bargaining. In Wedderburn's view, this involved both a misdiagnosis and an unhelpful prescription: there was little evidence that 'direct democracy' was to blame for increased levels of industrial action, for example, and little chance that the collective parties could succeed in sorting things out for themselves, without the intervention of government. Kahn-Freund was quite wrong to adhere still to his long-held view that the collective parties were capable of regulating industrial relations autonomously as they ought to be regulated, in furtherance of the public good.
In the political context of the 1980s and 1990s, such differences of opinion were important because they allowed Wedderburn to construct a convincing argument in favour of the continued usefulness of collective laissez-faire as a framework for the scholarly analysis of labour law. In the decades following Kahn-Freund's death, the primary task for scholars, in Wedderburn's view, was to identify ways of challenging the increasingly hegemonic free market ideology of 
